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Abstract 
Research into the glass cliff indicates that adverse company circumstances, 
compared to favorable ones, increase the likelihood of women to be appointed in 
leadership positions. Study 1 refined the conditions under which a glass cliff occurs 
by demonstrating a preference for a female leader when a company’s performance 
was attributed to past leadership (an internal, controllable cause) but not when it was 
attributed to global economic circumstances (an external, uncontrollable cause). 
Study 2 replicated the glass cliff for a controllable context and revealed that the 
female candidate’s potential to signal change, rather than her quality and suitability 
as a leader, accounted for the preference of the female candidate. We conclude that 
women, as non-traditional leaders, are strategic choices of companies with the aim to 
signal change to the outside world (e.g., investors) when past leadership is held 
responsible for a crisis. However, they are not expected to actually impact on the 
company’s performance through their leadership quality. 
 
Keywords. Glass cliff, leadership, controllability, financial crisis, symbolic 
change, actual change. 
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After the 2008 financial crisis, Icelandic banks appointed female leaders “to 
clean up the ’young men’s mess’” (O’Connor, 2008a) that was seen to be caused by 
“buccaneering, reckless - and overwhelmingly male” directors (Sunderland, 2009). As 
a government minister contended, the appointment of two women as chief executives 
to two newly founded Icelandic banks “is an attempt to signal a new culture within the 
banking system” (O’Connor, 2008b). In parallel, the governance of the country was 
trusted to a woman, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, who in 2009 became the first woman to 
be the Prime Minister of Iceland. 
The preference for women in these roles may be surprising given the evidence 
that women’s chances of being appointed to leadership positions are typically lower 
than are men’s (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002). This is the case, at least in part, because 
stereotypes convey a masculine image of leaders (the think manager - think male 
association, Schein, 2001; see also Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). 
However, the Icelandic case suggests that in troubled times, a female presence may 
be advantageous. This is supported by a program of research that illustrates through 
experimental and archival studies that women may occupy leadership positions more 
readily under precarious than favorable conditions, a phenomenon that has been 
labeled the glass cliff (e.g., Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Haslam, 2005, 2007). 
Research has documented the glass-cliff phenomenon in different organizational 
(e.g., Bruckmüller & Branscombe, 2010) and political (Ryan, Haslam, & Kulich, 2010) 
contexts, and for different minority groups (see Cook & Glass, 2013; Kulich, Ryan, & 
Haslam, 2014, for ethnic minorities). Despite the amount of evidence documenting 
glass-cliff tendencies, and a growing literature investigating some of the processes 
underlying the glass cliff (see Bruckmüller, Ryan, Rink, & Haslam, 2014, for an 
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overview), it is not clear whether glass cliffs occur in any type of crisis or whether the 
nature of the crisis is important.  
Refining the Notion of “Crisis” 
In view of the financial crisis being a highly topical issue in current world 
economics, it is highly relevant to ask whether the appointment of women to glass-
cliff positions occurs as a consequence of any type of crisis, or whether the perceived 
cause of the crisis plays a role. The present research fills this gap in the literature by 
disentangling the impact of a crisis that derives from faulty management of the 
company and a crisis that stems from global economic trends that are not under the 
control of the company’s management. 
Past experimental studies exploring the glass cliff have not always been 
explicit about the type of crisis faced by a company, nor about the role of past 
leadership in the development of the crisis (e.g., Haslam & Ryan, 2007). One 
exception comes from Bruckmüller and Branscombe (2010). Here, the authors gave 
information about the history of a company's past leadership by informing participants 
about the gender of the previous leader. This had an impact on participants’ choice of 
the incoming leader, such that they were more likely to appoint a woman when the 
former leader had been male rather than female. This finding suggests that 
participants inferred that the crisis had something to do with the type of past 
leadership, and it is likely that in many other glass cliff studies participants thought by 
default that previous management was male. However, typical glass cliff studies do 
not distinguish between internal and external causes of a company’s crisis. To 
illustrate, Gartzia, Ryan, Balluerka, & Aritzeta (2012, p. 10) told participants that the 
company in question had “experienced decreasing performance during the preceding 
months as a consequence of both the current negative global financial situation and 
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the lack of management abilities of the existing management team.” In this scenario, 
we find a similar situation as in the Icelandic banks, where causes for the crisis 
combine both controllable reasons (i.e., banks' risky management) and 
uncontrollable reasons (i.e., the general financial crisis). The aim of the present 
research is to disentangle these two types of reasons. 
We argue that a different, new leadership may be viewed as a proactive way 
to deal with a crisis following faulty leadership. In this way, that the appointment of a 
non-traditional leader (i.e., a woman) should be most likely in a context where the 
company can actually intervene and change things, that is, when the company 
possesses some control over the causes for poor performance. Traditional 
leadership positions are typically seen as masculine and are thus most likely to be 
occupied by male leaders (Schein, 2001). Hence, signaling a significant change in 
leadership can be achieved by the replacement of a man by an atypical leader. 
Indeed, research demonstrates that adverse situations produce a desire for change, 
and that under such circumstances outsiders are likely to be chosen as leaders 
(Kaplan & Minton, 1994). It further shows that stereotypes associate stability with 
male leaders, and change with female leaders (Brown, Diekman, & Schneider, 2011). 
Thus, in a controllable crisis context a female leader may be seen as a good fit. In 
contrast, if a company’s crisis stems from a global economic crisis, which is 
uncontrollable by leaders, changing the leadership of the company may not be the 
ideal solution.  
In summary, the choice of a woman for a leadership position may be judged to 
be advantageous when poor performance results from a company’s previous (actual 
or supposedly) male management practices. Conversely, the replacement of a man 
by a woman may not be judged helpful in a company that struggles because 
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everyone around it struggles as well. When previous leadership is not identified as 
responsible for poor performance, it may be neither necessary nor enough to replace 
it to change the situation. 
Now the issue is what kind of change is expected from the appointment of a 
woman instead of a man in precarious times following faulty management. The next 
section will discuss two mechanisms that potentially cause glass cliff appointments. 
Organizational Change as an Explanation of the Glass Cliff 
One of the most explored explanations of the glass cliff is that stereotypes of 
women are associated with a communal leadership style that is deemed useful in 
difficult times (Ryan et al., 2014). If past agentic and typically masculine leadership 
are seen as unsuccessful, suitable leadership may be newly defined in a crisis 
context. As seen in the Icelandic example, an alternative leadership style would be 
communal and more risk-averse. Social roles associated with women fit such 
expectations. In line with social role congruency theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), 
women should then become more likely to be selected as leaders. Indeed, Ryan, 
Haslam, Hersby, and Bongiorno (2011) provided empirical evidence that communal 
traits, such as being understanding, tactful, and empathic, are valued in times of 
crisis. However, instead of actively improving the company’s performance, these 
stereotypical feminine traits are only rated more useful than masculine traits for 
“passive” leadership missions such as enduring and taking the blame of a crisis, and 
for managing people (see also Gartzia, Ryan, Balluerka, & Aritzeta, 2012; Rink, 
Ryan, & Stoker, 2013). Importantly, when the leader’s mission is to directly impact on 
the company´s economic situation, masculine traits are valued to the same extent as 
feminine traits (Ryan et al., 2011, Study 3). Translating these findings on gendered 
traits to the male and female social categories, the choice of an atypical leader (i.e., a 
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woman instead of a man) may not indicate the valorization of feminine leadership 
competence as a means for improving performance, but it may rather signal to the 
evaluators of the company (i.e., investors, clients, and other companies) that the 
company is taking action in order to cope with the crisis. The aim is to influence 
investors’ evaluations towards a positive trend, a strategy called “window dressing” in 
the finance world (Helland & Sykuta, 2004). 
In sum, changing the leadership of a company through the appointment of a 
woman may be confined to a visible signal of change, that is a strategy to influence 
the evaluations of an under-performing company and thereby potentially impact, for 
example, the company’s market performance (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & 
Haslam, 2007; Ryan, Haslam, & Postmes, 2007; see also Bruckmüller et al., 2014). 
However, it might not actually aim at an actual change as regard to a different way of 
leading the company that would directly impact the company’s (accounting) 
performance (see Kulich, Iacoviello, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2015, for a discussion). 
The Present Research 
In this paper, we argue that when a company is facing a crisis, the company 
board may seek solutions to reverse the current negative trend. As was suggested by 
the Icelandic government minister cited in the Introduction, one strategy is to appoint 
a non-traditional leader that will visibly break with the previous type of leadership. As 
a consequence, appointing a woman in a struggling company would be a strategic 
way to implement change. Such a strategy is only likely used when a company’s 
performance is deemed controllable, that is, when it is not contingent on external, 
uncontrollable factors.  
In accordance with previous research into the glass cliff, we expect that a 
woman will be preferred as an incoming leader in a poorly-performing company 
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compared to a successful company. However, in line with our signal of change 
argument, we argue that the preference for a woman should emerge only in 
controllable types of crises and not in external crises (Hypothesis 1). Study 1 will test 
this hypothesis by examining gendered leadership choices in two experimentally-
created attributional contexts: a company’s performance that is primarily influenced 
by its past leadership (internal and controllable), and a company’s performance that 
is primarily influenced by economic circumstances (external and uncontrollable).  
In addition, we reason that when faulty past leadership is the cause of the 
company’s failure, replacing male leadership with female leadership is likely to 
indicate that this change is strategic. Thus, Study 2 will focus on a context of a 
controllable crisis, and will examine whether a glass cliff occurs because the choice 
of a woman is seen to be a strategic signal of change, and not because a female way 
of leading is perceived to have the potential to actually change the company’s 
performance (Hypothesis 2). 
Study 1 
In order to test H1, that the appointment of women in times of crisis might be a 
signal of organizational change, this study aimed to examine the specific 
circumstances in which glass cliffs occur. Previous research on the glass cliff has 
focused on the selection of qualified male and female candidates in flourishing or 
troubled organizational (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Haslam, 2005) and political 
(Ryan, et al., 2010) settings. The present study adds to this body of literature by 
including the information that company performance was either controllable (driven 
by previous leadership) or uncontrollable (driven by the overall economy). The design 
was a 2 (company performance: poor vs. strong) × 2 (performance attribution: 
controllable vs. uncontrollable) between-participants experimental design.  
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Method 
Sample. Participants were 159 students from a Swiss university (106 female 
and 52 male, 1 gender-unspecified)1 who were recruited after regular class courses. 
Their mean age was 22.54 years (SD = 3.68), ranging from 18 to 46 years. 
Participants’ socio-demographic categories were uniformly distributed across 
conditions. The university is located in the French part of Switzerland which is 
progressive in equal opportunities for minority groups. For example, the population of 
the region is highly diverse (40% foreigners, Office Cantonal de la Statistique, 
OCSTAT, 2011) and the gender pay gap is half the size (9.6%, OCSTAT, 2010) of 
the general Swiss pay-gap. 
Materials and procedure. We presented participants with a fictitious article 
(adapted from Haslam & Ryan, 2008) about a Swiss electronics company (LPG) that 
was recruiting a new executive director. The article described the company’s 
performance (increasing vs decreasing) and the attribution for that performance (past 
leadership vs economic circumstances). The controllable cause emphasized that the 
company’s leadership was responsible for strong or poor performance, and that only 
that particular company was affected. In the uncontrollable condition, it was made 
clear that corporate performance matched a global rise or decline of the entire 
electronics industry. 
For the increasing controllable performance (vs decreasing performance in 
brackets), participants read that “The electronic company is thriving (struggling) due 
to the good (bad) management by the board of directors (…) [which] has a positive 
                                            
1
 In this and the following study, participant gender had no consistent impact 
on the dependent variables, and was therefore not considered further. 
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(negative) impact on profits and sales. (…) LPG, specialist of mobile phones, 
announces an increase (a decrease) in orders of 25% for this year.” In addition, a 
graph reflecting poor versus strong company performance over the last four years 
was presented. The uncontrollable manipulation of increasing performance (vs 
decreasing performance in brackets) was: “The electronics branch is thriving 
(struggling) due to the advantageous economic situation (the economic crisis) (…) 
[which] has a positive (negative) impact on profits and sales (…) LPG, specialist of 
mobile phones, announces an increase (a decrease) in orders of 25% for this year”.  
After the experimental manipulations, a short paragraph outlined the duties of 
the new director2, which did not differ across experimental conditions: “The main duty 
of the new director will be to implement new strategies in order to respond to the 
competition of supermarkets (…) that are now selling cheap mobile phones.”. 
After reading the scenario, we presented two manipulation-check items for 
performance (“Do you think the situation of this company is”: 1 = very bad to 7 = very 
good) and attribution (“Who is responsible for the good (bad) development of this 
company?”: 1 = good (bad) economic conditions to 7 = good (bad) previous 
management).  
                                            
2
 Bruckmüller and Branscombe (2010) suggest that the glass cliff is specific to 
a context where previous male leadership is inferred. As a preliminary step, we thus 
conducted a pilot study to verify that our scenarios elicited the expectation that the 
previous manager was a man. Participants (N = 59 students) were equally distributed 
across the four scenarios. After reading the scenario, they rated if they thought that 
the previous manager was a man or a woman. All of the participants except one 
indicated that the previous manager was a man, χ2 (1, N = 59) = 55.07, p < .001. 
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Participants were then presented with three short CVs of potential candidates. 
Two of them were male and one was female. The descriptions of one male candidate 
and the female candidate were matched for their qualifications and suitability for the 
job (high educational level, excellent work experience). In contrast, the second male 
candidate was described as less qualified (lower education, poorer work experience).  
The dependent variable consisted of the choice of one of the three candidates 
according to their suitability for the new executive post. Following past research on 
the glass cliff (e.g., Haslam & Ryan, 2008), the unqualified candidate served as a 
check to see if participants would exclude him and make their decision based on the 
two remaining qualified candidates. Finally, participants provided their demographics 
(gender, age, education, employment), and were fully debriefed about the purpose of 
the study. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Two ANOVAs with performance, attribution, and their 
interaction were performed on both manipulation-check items. Results showed an 
effect for performance on the performance manipulation-check item (F (1, 155) = 
541.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .78) indicating that the company in the strong performance 
condition was perceived as better performing (M = 5.35, SD = 1.03) than the 
company in the poor performance condition (M = 2.04, SD = .77). Moreover, a main 
effect of the attribution manipulation check (F (1, 155) = 225.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .59) 
revealed that in the internal attribution condition the company board was perceived 
as more responsible for the company performance (M = 5.29, SD = 1.01) than in the 
external attribution condition (M = 2.84, SD = 1.07). 
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Preliminary analysis.  Not surprisingly, both qualified candidates were 
selected more often (woman by 50% and man by 37% of the participants) compared 
to the unqualified man (13%), χ2 (1, n = 159) = 34.98, p < .001. The choice of the 
unqualified man did not vary across conditions. Thus, all further analysis will focus on 
the two qualified candidates (reducing n to 139 participants). 
Choice of candidate.  We performed a logistic regression analysis with 
candidate choice as the criterion (female candidate = 1, male candidate = 0), and 
company performance (strong = -1 vs poor = 1), performance attribution (controllable 
= -1 vs uncontrollable = 1), and their interaction as the predictors.  
This analysis produced a Performance × Attribution interaction, B = -.48, χ2 (1, 
n = 139) = 6.96, p = .008, eB = .62 (see Figure 1). Simple slope analysis 
demonstrated an effect of performance in the controllable condition on the probability 
of choosing the female candidate (as opposed to the male), B = .52, χ2 (1, n = 139) = 
4.44, p = .04, eB = 1.69. In support of H1, where there was controllable attribution for 
company performance, the female candidate was more likely to be chosen in the 
poorly-performing company (65%) than in the strongly-performing company (39%). 
These same figures indicate that, compared to the male candidate, the female 
candidate was less likely to be chosen in the strongly-performing company (39%; 
two-tailed binomial test3, p = .02), and more likely to be chosen in the poorly-
performing company (65%; two-tailed binomial test, p = .002). Company performance 
did not produce a significant difference in the uncontrollable condition, B = -.43, χ2 (1, 
                                            
3
 This test indicates if the probability of choosing the female candidate is 
significantly different from chance (in this case 50%), and thus significantly different 
from the choice of a man). 
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n = 139) = 2.69, p = .10, eB = 0.65, such that the female candidate was chosen by 
75% of participants in the strongly and by 52% in the poorly performing company. 
Moreover, in the well-performing uncontrollable condition, the female candidate was 
more likely to be chosen than the male candidate (75%, two-tailed binomial test, p < 
.001). Finally, simple slopes analysis showed that in the well-performing company 
condition the female candidate was more likely to be selected in the uncontrollable 
condition (75%) than in the controllable condition (39%), B = .72, χ2 (1, n = 139) = 
7.00, p = .008, eB = 2.06. No significant differences occurred between the controllable 
and uncontrollable poor company conditions, B = -.23, χ2 (1, n = 139) = .95, p = .33, 
eB = .80. The main effects of performance (B = .05, χ2 (1, n = 139) = .07, p = .80, eB = 
1.05) and attribution (B = .24, χ2 (1, n = 139) = 1.86, p = .17, eB = 1.28) were non-
significant. 
Discussion 
The findings from this study provided support for H1, suggesting that company 
failure (as opposed to company success) increased the chances of a female 
candidate being appointed as a new leader compared to an equally qualified male 
candidate, but only when company’s performance was attributed to previous 
management. No such pattern emerged when company performance was attributed 
to the economy, an uncontrollable cause. Here, a woman was as likely to be chosen 
in the poorly-performing company as in the strongly-performing one. Thus, the results 
suggest that women are only likely to confront glass cliffs under conditions where a 
company’s poor performance has originated in faulty leadership, rather than in more 
uncontrollable contexts such as the one provided by a global crisis.  
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This finding provides initial insights into one of the potential causes of the 
glass cliff phenomenon. The observation that women are only preferred in a 
leadership crisis but not in an economic crisis gives support to the interpretation that 
the appointment of a female leader may relate to the urge of a company to implement 
change. An investigation of the type of change (signal of change vs actual change) 
will follow in Study 2.  
A further intriguing difference in the female candidate’s likelihood to be 
appointed as a leader was observed between the two successful performance 
conditions. Here, the female candidate was almost twice as likely to be chosen when 
an increase in performance was attributable to an economic upturn (75%), rather 
than good leadership (39%). Moreover, the female candidate was also more likely to 
be chosen during an economic upturn compared to a man. If we consider that 
women tend not to be viewed as prototypical and successful leaders (Ryan et al., 
2011; Schein, 2001) it is not surprising that the female candidate was not the 
preferred leader when previous (presumably male) management was given credit for 
good outcomes. In this case, the preferred leader should continue the past 
successful leadership and thus be a person displaying a traditional agentic 
leadership. This is most likely the case when a man takes the lead. Hence this may 
be the reason for the male preference.  
In contrast, when the economic situation boosts the company’s performance, a 
leader does not have to be an agent of the company’s performance because success 
is nearly secured. Thus, the choice of a prototypical (male) manager is not an 
absolute necessity and anyone can do the job, even individuals who are stereotyped 
to be less competent as leaders. In this line several reasons may drive decision-
makers to opt for a woman in a situation where external factors lead to prosperity. 
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First, choosing a woman involves low risk for those who are not persuaded of 
women’s leadership abilities. In this way, even if expectations that a woman will fail to 
be a good leader are fulfilled, the company would not experience any harm since the 
economy is stable and will weaken, or even prevent, visible consequences of bad 
leadership. Second, there is a general societal pressure not to discriminate against 
disadvantaged groups. For example, gender equality rankings of countries and 
companies depend more than ever on their gender-equality policies and presence of 
female managers (e.g., Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2011; Vinnicombe, Sealy, 
Graham, & Dolder, 2010). Quota policies have been implemented in several 
European countries (e.g., France, and Scandinavian countries, see for an overview 
Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2012, 2014) and are 
currently discussed in others (e.g., Germany). Thus, choosing a woman may indeed 
publicize a socially desirable act. And finally, diversity may be easier to implement in 
economically thriving times. Potential costs that may arise from appointing and 
training individuals who are perceived to be less prototypical for a position are thus 
affordable.  
Study 2 
This study sought to further investigate the processes underlying the 
appointment of women in a time of crisis. As stated in H2, a female candidate is 
expected to be preferentially chosen in a poorly performing company with past faulty 
leadership because her atypicality for a leadership position is believed to symbolize 
change to evaluators of the company and not because of her qualification or 
suitability to handle the crisis and improve the company performance. In the present 
study, we concentrated on a company which performance is attributable to 
controllable forces (previous poor vs strong leadership). To delve into the explanatory 
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mechanisms, we added explicit questions about the candidates’ ability to signal 
change and their qualification and suitability for the position. The study was a 2 
(company performance: strong vs poor) between-participants experimental design. 
Method 
Sample.  Participants were 93 Swiss University students (55 female and 38 
male) enrolled in a social and economic sciences degree. Their mean age was 20.81 
years (SD = 2.06), ranging from 17 to 29 years. Age and gender demographics were 
uniformly distributed across conditions. 
Materials and procedure. Participants read a description of a company which 
performance was manipulated as in Study 1 and answered a manipulation-check 
item on the quality of the company’s performance (“The situation of this company 
is…”: 1 = very bad to 7 = very good). Participants were then asked to choose a 
leader from two equally competent candidates, a woman and a man. The CVs were 
the same as in Study 1, except for the exclusion of a sentence on family status (i.e., 
that the candidate had husband/wife and two children). This modification aimed to 
ensure that gendered notions of parenthood would not impact on participants’ 
decisions (e.g., “motherhood penalty” vs “fatherhood bonus”; Fuegen, Biernat, 
Haines, & Deaux, 2004). Moreover, the CVs were counter-balanced across gender 
and condition. After making their choice, we asked participants about their reason for 
choosing the candidate on two dimensions implying either signal or actual change. 
Two items related to signaling change: “I think the fact of appointing this candidate 
will show that the company wants to change the type of management“, and “I think 
that the choice of this candidate symbolizes a visible change for partners and 
competitors”: (1 = disagree to 7 = agree), r = .82, p < .001. Two further items related 
to candidate qualification and suitability which was our proxy for actual change: “I 
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think this candidate is the most qualified”, and “I think this candidate’s leadership 
style is the most suitable”, r = .44, p < .001. Finally, we asked participants about their 
age and gender. 
Results 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA with performance as the predictor was 
conducted on the performance manipulation check. Results showed a significant 
effect for performance on the performance manipulation-check item (F (1, 91) = 
573.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .86), such that in the strong performance condition 
participants rated the company’s performance as significantly better (M = 5.89, SD = 
.89) than in the poor performance condition (M = 1.78, SD = .76). 
Choice of company. In order to examine whether the female candidate was 
more likely to be chosen in times of crisis, we first performed a logistic regression 
analysis with candidate choice as the criterion (woman = 1, man = 0) and company 
performance as the predictor. This analysis produced a significant performance 
effect, B = .99, χ2 (1, n = 93) = 4.03, p < .05, eB = 2.69, indicating that the female 
candidate was more likely to be chosen in a poorly performing company (64%) than 
in a strongly performing one (20%).  
We then performed a mediational analysis to assess whether this preference 
could be accounted for by the expectation that the chosen candidate would signal 
organizational change. Following the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping 
procedure, we introduced signal of change and actual change as mediators of the 
effect of company performance on candidate choice (see Table 1).  
This analysis demonstrated that actual change did not mediate the effect of 
company performance on choice of the candidate, 95% CI [-.18, .18]. Indeed, 
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company performance did not impact on actual change, B = .01, SE = .29, p = .97, 
and actual change was unrelated to choice of the candidate, B = -.14, SE = .22, p = 
.52, Wald = .41. Conversely, company performance predicted signal of change, B = 
.67, SE = .31, p = .04, which in turn predicted a preference for the female (vs. male) 
candidate, B = .44, SE = .21, p = .04, Wald = 4.03. The direct significant effect of 
company performance on candidate choice, B = .99, SE = .49, p = .045, Wald = 4.03, 
was reduced to non-significance, B = .75, SE = .52, p = .15, Wald = 2.12 through the 
signal of change mediator, B = .29, SE = .23, 95% CI [.00, .94]. In summary, the 
female candidate was more likely to be chosen in a poorly performing company 
because she was perceived to signal change, and not because she was perceived to 
be qualified and suitable for the position (actual change). 
Discussion 
Study 2 corroborated the glass cliff findings from the preceding study by 
demonstrating that a female candidate is the preferred leader when faulty 
management is held responsible for company's bad performances. In addition, the 
findings showed that the choice of the woman in precarious times can be accounted 
for by the fact that participants believed that she represented change. Conversely, 
the actual change measure investigating candidates’ qualification and suitability for 
the leadership role did not impact on the female candidate’s choice in the precarious 
context. It seems that she was selected not because of her value as a leader (i.e., 
leadership credentials) but because of her membership in the female category. Thus, 
participants focused on her symbolic rather than actual potential for change. Ryan 
and colleagues (2011) have indirectly pointed to the idea that women may not be 
seen as agents to improve company performance. They showed that female 
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stereotypes were particularly linked to passive leadership missions (e.g., enduring or 
taking the blame of a crisis), whereas to improve a company’s performance 
masculine traits were as important as feminine traits. In sum, this study empirically 
supports previous suggestions that appointing women may signal efforts to do 
something about the troubled situation of a company (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & 
Haslam, 2007; Ryan et al., 2007). In addition, it demonstrates that women are not 
expected to actively handle the crisis and turn around the business because they 
were not selected for their leadership credentials. 
General Discussion 
Past research on the glass cliff has demonstrated that women have better 
chances to become leaders in troubled times than in flourishing times. The current 
research provides additional evidence for this phenomenon, and adds to this 
literature that glass cliffs occur because of a company’s desire to signal 
organizational change in difficult times. The findings from Study 1 demonstrated that 
a female candidate is more likely to be appointed in times of crisis when change is 
likely to be effective for the company, which was the case when company 
performance was attributed to an internal, controllable cause (e.g., past poor 
leadership). In contrast, when company performance is attributed to an external, 
uncontrollable cause (e.g., global economic circumstances), a female candidate is 
equally likely to be selected in a crisis and during a global economic upturn. Study 2 
extended these findings by demonstrating that a woman’s potential of signaling a 
change is responsible of her increased chance of being selected under precarious 
circumstances rather than in an economically healthy company. 
What Kind of Change? 
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In Study 1 we have provided initial evidence for one potential cause of the 
glass cliff that is related to change. Study 2 has investigated the kind of change that 
the choice of a woman implies. As mentioned in the Introduction, the change 
associated to the governance of the Icelandic banks was described as replacing a 
traditional (i.e., male) management and as signaling change. Kulich et al. (2015) 
suggest that it may be useful to differentiate between two distinct change motivations 
that may underlie glass-cliff selections: a motivation to signal change to the outside 
world, and a motivation to actually change the way a company is led. Study 2 shows 
that the first motivation explains glass cliff choices, but not the second. 
The first motivation bears on a symbolic strategy, and can be referred to as 
“window dressing” (Helland & Sykuta, 2004). Here, the choice of a woman, or 
another atypical leader, publicizes a change to the outside world (e.g., investors, 
competitors, etc.). In this case, companies may attempt to “fool” the market by 
ostensibly showing that they are aware that change is needed, and by pretending 
that they are actually doing something by changing the board of directors. The 
announcement of a visibly different leader may be interpreted as a change, and is 
thus likely to impact on the market performance (i.e., options and share prices) of the 
company. This strategy could help the company to gain time in order to turn around 
the situation. However, in the long run, companies would be urged to demonstrate 
that they are actually improving and not just signaling change.  
As for the second motivation, the question is what type of leader does a 
company choose when it wants to actually change its accounting performance (sales, 
profits, productivity, employment, etc.). Ryan and colleagues (2011) give some cues 
suggesting that when it comes to improving the company’s performance, the 
combination of feminine and masculine leadership styles may be most valued (for a 
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more general tendency towards androgynous leadership see also Koenig et al., 
2011; Paustian-Underdhal, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). In Study 2 the qualification and 
suitability of the female candidate, that is qualities of a leader that are linked to actual 
change, clearly did not explain the occurrence of a glass cliff.  
In this research we did not manipulate information on gendered traits of the 
candidate. Thus, it is not clear yet if and how information on the biological sex of a 
leader in combination with gendered descriptions of a candidate affect leader choices 
that aim to actually change the way in which a company is led. Future research 
should investigate the interaction of sex and gender and the two change concepts 
more in depth. For example, findings by Ryan and collegaues (2011, Study 3) 
suggest that the mission to passively endure a crisis and the mission to actively act 
on the crisis do not ask for the same styles of leadership (see also Gartzia et al., 
2012). It may be that if actual change is demanded, no glass cliff occurs, and that 
women in such crisis contexts still face prejudice. More precisely, even if they are 
capable leaders who might strive to actually turn around a company, this may infer a 
violation of the more communal leadership style, which is expected from women. As 
a result, women who wish to actively tackle a crisis – a male behavior – may face 
negative “backlash” reactions (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004) and miss out on selections 
in contexts where the leadership role is by definition an agentic one.  
Company Performance and Female Directors 
Although the present research supports the signal of change conjecture, little 
is known about the actual impact of women’s presence in leadership positions on 
companies’ performances. We began this article by outlining the main rhetoric given 
by politicians and economists during the appointment of women to lead two Icelandic 
banks and Iceland itself during the 2008 financial crisis. These reasons focused on 
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the unwarranted risky behavior of previous male managers, suggesting that the 
choice of women was motivated by actually changing the way these banks were led 
with the aim to impact on accounting performance. Recent surveys have analogously 
shown that the greater the female presence in French companies, the lesser were 
the negative consequences of the financial and economic crisis for these companies 
on accounting performance (e.g., Ferrary, 2009, 2010; see also Landrieux-
Kartochian, 2010). Similar findings were revealed in an analysis of more than 3000 
companies worldwide over the period of the financial crisis (Credit Suisse Research 
Institute, 2012). The female proportion of directors was positively related to risk-
averseness and better company performance in most countries around the world.  
However, such research does not warrant causal claims. As Adler (2001) 
maintains, “While it could be concluded that a firm's long-term record of promoting 
women to high positions results in higher than normal profitability, it could also be 
argued that firms with higher profitability may feel freer to experiment with the 
promotion of women to high levels.” (p. 6). Similarly, the authors of the Credit Suisse 
report call for prudence in the interpretation of female proportion and performance 
relationships and point to a multi-facet dynamic: “Do better companies hire more 
women, do women choose to work for more successful companies, or do women 
themselves help improve companies’ performance? The most likely answer is a 
combination of the three.” (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014, p. 4). Supporting 
the idea that prosperity may lead to female appointments, Study 1 showed that 
women are indeed more likely to be selected in a thriving company during general 
economic prosperity, as compared to a company that is thriving due to previous 
management.  
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As for the signal of change effect, research shows that the proportion of 
female and minority board members is related to firms’ charitable contributions 
(Wang & Coffey, 1992), and that appointing women may be “window dressing” in an 
attempt to prove diversity, but not expecting these directors to actually interfere with 
company politics and governance (Helland & Sykuta, 2004). Similarly, in the Credit 
Suisse report the researchers argue that  
[…] there is no causation between greater gender diversity and improved 
profitability and stock price performance. Instead the link may be the positive 
signal that is sent to the market by the appointment of more women: first because 
it may signal greater focus on corporate governance and second because it is a 
sign that the company is already doing well. (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 
2012, p. 17)  
These observations are in line with our finding that signal of change rather 
than actual change accounts for the glass cliff.  
The emerging overall picture is that companies with a higher female proportion 
in top management may be better equipped to cope with the financial crisis 
compared to those that are male dominated. However, these examples should not 
raise excessive confidence and optimism for women accessing the top of corporate 
hierarchy. Most of the time, women’s access to the top elicits negative reactions, 
notably among investors (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). As archival data illustrate, the 
announcement of a female chief executive officer is often conducive to a drop of 
financial investments in those companies (Lee & James, 2007). In concert, in the UK, 
Financial Times Stock Exchange companies’ market performance decreased after 
the appointment of female directors, despite the fact that accounting performance 
remained stable (Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010). And finally, the 
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above reported positive relationship in France concerned only female presence and 
accounting performance; Market performance and female representation amongst 
managers and employees were clearly negatively related (Ferrary, 2010). This 
suggests that women did not negatively influence the companies’ performance, but 
investors’ doubts led to unfavorable developments in the company’s stock prices.  
Overall, experimental evidence from Study 2 and suggestions in the above 
cited literature point to decisions on leadership that are motivated by strategic forms 
of change in order to positively influence investors’ evaluations of company 
performance. However, in parallel archival research suggest that investors actually 
react negatively to female appointments – at least in the short run (Ferrary, 2010; 
Haslam et al., 2010; Lee & James, 2007). Archival and experimental research needs 
to take into account the interaction between companies’ decisions and investors’ 
actual reactions. In particular, investors’ reactions in the long run as well as the larger 
economic context need to be considered because different types of leadership and 
different types of strategies may be judged appropriate. 
Conclusion 
The findings from the present research identify important boundary conditions 
to the selection of women for top-management positions. The selection of a female 
candidate in times of crisis occurred predominately in circumstances where that crisis 
was attributed to a controllable cause. Moreover, this was due to the fact that the 
female candidate was viewed as a signal of change, and not to perceptions of her 
greater suitability to deal with the crisis. Thus, if previous male leadership has proven 
unsuccessful (Bruckmüller & Branscombe, 2010), preference for a woman publicizes 
the company’s intention to implement a change, but this change is not viewed as 
being enacted by this woman’s leadership capacities. Overall, these findings suggest 
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that glass-cliff choices are, at least in part, strategic (Haslam & Ryan, 2008). 
However, an intriguing question arises: If, as our data show, women are preferred as 
leaders in times of controllable crises and in times of economic upturns, why do we 
see so few women in those positions? One reason may stem from the way in which 
companies frame their failures and successes (e.g., Zuckerman, 1979). If managers 
frame successes as their own achievements and attribute their failures to 
uncontrollable, external causes rather than to their own deficiencies, new directors 
will most likely be men again.  
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Table 1 
Signal of Change as Mediator of the Relationship between Candidate Gender and 
Company Performance (Study 2) 
 Candidate gender (DV) 
Path/Effect B SE              CI95%  
a (company performance  mediators) 
 
1. Signal of change .67* .32  
2. Actual change .01 .29  
b (mediators  DV) 
   
1. Signal of change .44* .20  
2. Actual change -.14 .22  
c (company performance  DV) .99* .49  
c' (company performance  DV) .75 .52  
Indirect effects (a x b) 
1. Signal of change .29 .32            [.00, .94]  
2. Actual change -.00 .09            [-.18, .18]  
Note. Estimates are unstandardized. * p < .05, DV = dependent variable
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Figure 1. Study 1: Impact of company performance and attribution on candidate 
choice (female versus male) 
  
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
controllable uncontrollable
P
ro
b
a
b
il
ty
 o
f 
ch
o
o
si
n
g
 f
e
m
a
le
 c
a
n
d
id
a
te
 
(%
) strong
poor
Performance
Performance
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
REFINING THE CONDITIONS OF GLASS CLIFFS                                                  34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Study 2: Impact of company performance, and signal vs actual change 
expectations on candidate choice (female versus male) 
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Highlights 
• A glass cliff describes the preferential selection of a female leader in a crisis. 
• We manipulate company performance and its attributions (economy vs 
leadership).  
• A glass cliff only occurs if company’s performance is attributed to bad 
leadership. 
• The glass cliff is explained by the woman’s perceived potential to signal 
change.  
• Nontraditional leaders are strategic choices to signal change to the outside 
world. 
 
 
